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I. Introduction
This paper describes how the English courts, in a “heroic act of judicial invention”,1 have developed a distinct vulnerability jurisdiction, 
separate and apart from the ancient jurisdiction of parens patriae, through 
the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. This new jurisdiction 
provides a legal basis and mechanism for the disruption of exploitative 
relationship contexts. The objective of that disruption is not protection 
per se (the parens patriae objective), but the safeguarding of individual 
autonomy rights in situations where those rights cannot be effectively 
exercised without intervention. In doing so, the court is responding to 
relationship vulnerability, a particular quality of vulnerability that is not 
dependent on or derived from personal characteristics such as age, gender, 
or mental disability, although the relationship between these factors 
(together with others such as economic status) may intensify relationship 
1. Sir James Munby, “Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable and Incapacitous 
Adults – The Role of the Courts: An Example of Judicial Law-making” 
(2014) 26 Child & Family Law Quarterly 64 at 77 [Munby].
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vulnerability so as to justify intervention in a particular case.2 This 
response is founded on the understanding that legal/public intervention 
is not the only possible source of autonomy restriction. In this way, 
the vulnerability jurisdiction is conceptually rooted in the doctrine of 
equitable fraud (in particular, the doctrine of undue influence), and the 
new jurisdiction is most coherently understood as an extension of the 
equitable doctrine (rather than the resurgence of a new parens patriae) 
in situations outside of the contractual/testamentary context and at the 
instigation of third parties (public or private). 
The process of “judicial invention” through which the jurisdiction has 
developed has been lengthy and non-linear, generating confusion about 
its source and nature. In terms of both language and origin (the decision 
in the case of In Re F 3 (“In Re F”), a response to the disappearance of 
parens patriae with regard to mentally incapable adults in England), the 
new jurisdiction has been tangled up with the old to the extent that 
it has been described (mistakenly) as a rebirth and extension of parens 
patriae, “the invention … by the family judges of a full-blown welfare-
based parens patriae jurisdiction in relation to incapacitated adults” and 
to other “vulnerable persons”.4 
One source of confusion has been the nebulous and ill-defined 
nature of the “inherent jurisdiction of the court” as distinct from parens 
patriae (which is occasionally described as “the inherent jurisdiction”). 
The distinction between the two is explained below. The language 
of “vulnerability”, as used in the law generally and the cases discussed 
here in particular, is a further source of confusion. The new jurisdiction 
and parens patriae each enable public response to private vulnerability; 
vulnerability is not one idea, but several. Understanding the distinctions 
between these ideas is essential to understanding the nature of the new 
jurisdiction and how it differs from parens patriae in purpose and effect.
2. See MI Hall “Equity Theory: Responding to the Material Exploitation 
of the Vulnerable but Capable” in Israel Doron, ed, Theories on Law and 
Ageing: The Jurisprudence of Elder Law (Berlin: Springer Publications, 
2008) at 107.
3. [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL) [In Re F]. 
4. Munby, supra note 1 at 77.
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Parens patriae describes the state’s responsibility to protect the 
members of identified “vulnerable populations”: persons who are 
deemed incapable of protecting their own interests by reason of their 
particular personal characteristics. Children and mentally incapable 
adults are “vulnerable populations” of this kind and are, on this basis, 
the subjects of both parens patriae and specific legislation such as the 
Mental Capacity Act 20055 (“Mental Capacity Act”) discussed below. The 
new vulnerability jurisdiction described in this paper responds to a more 
universal, mutable vulnerability that waxes and wanes in connection with 
personal and other contextual circumstances, including the “quality and 
quantity of resources we possess or can command”.6 The distinction is 
significant, providing a coherent theoretical and principled basis for the 
new jurisdiction and delimiting the kind and scope of intervention it 
justifies; not a capacious or amorphous power of protection (the parens 
paradigm), but a more specific intervention for the purpose of creating a 
space in which autonomy can be developed and exercised. 
The first part of this paper describes in more detail the origin and 
nature of the parens patriae jurisdiction and the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court, respectively, together with a discussion of the distinctions 
between them. The second part of this paper describes the cases through 
which the new jurisdiction was developed prior to the Mental Capacity Act 
which filled the gap left by the removal of parens patriae with respect to 
5. (UK), c 9.
6. Martha Albertson Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality 
in the Human Condition” (2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 
1 (while “undeniably universal, human vulnerability is also particular: 
it is experienced uniquely by each of us and this experience is greatly 
influenced by the “quality and quantity of resources we possess or can 
command” at 8) and (“[v]ulnerability initially should be understood 
as arising from our embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present 
possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune from mildly adverse to 
catastrophically devastating events, whether accidental, intentional, 
or otherwise. Individuals can attempt to lessen the risk or mitigate 
the impact of such events, but they cannot eliminate their possibility. 
Understanding vulnerability begins with the realization that many such 
events are ultimately beyond human control” at 8).
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mentally incompetent adults in England. A declaration of lawfulness on 
the basis of the common law doctrine of necessity is used by the English 
courts in these cases to establish best interests and to justify interventions 
for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of incapable adults. 
The third part of this paper describes the development of a distinct 
vulnerability jurisdiction (i.e. not a replacement for parens patriate) 
through a series of cases decided after the Mental Capacity Act (which 
filled the parens patriae gap vis a vis incapable adults), culminating in DL 
v A Local Authority.7 This new jurisdiction provides a basis on which the 
courts can respond to vulnerability arising through relationship contexts 
(in respect of which no legislation applies), as opposed to the “protection-
needs” of vulnerable populations. The declaration of lawfulness in these 
later cases is rooted in the equitable doctrine of undue influence as 
opposed to the common law doctrine of necessity. This distinction is 
important and marks a decisive conceptual break from the earlier cases. 
The final part of this paper considers the implications of the English 
“invention” in the Canadian legal context.
II. Parens Pariae and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court
The parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts, while occasionally 
referred to as an inherent jurisdiction, is very different in source and 
purpose from the inherent jurisdiction of said superior courts. The parens 
patriae jurisdiction originated in the personal authority and responsibility 
of the King. The inherent jurisdiction of the court, in contrast, has 
been described as the “essence” of the superior court — its “immanent 
attribute” and “very life-blood”; a “peculiar concept … so amorphous 
and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation that it seems to defy 
7. [2012] EWCA Civ 253 [Local Authority].
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the challenge to determine its quality and establish its limits”.8 Thomas 
Cromwell, writing extra-judicially, referred to the “inherent jurisdiction” 
as an “original jurisdiction in any matter unless jurisdiction is clearly 
taken away by statute”,9 inherited by the Canadian superior courts of 
general jurisdiction as the descendants of the Royal Courts of Justice.
A. Parens Patriae 
Parens patriae refers to the state’s authority and responsibility to protect 
the best interests of vulnerable persons (defined, for this purpose, as 
members of vulnerable populations). The source of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Eve10 
as “lost in the mists of antiquity”, although the most probable theory 
was that Edward I had assumed the authority from the feudal lords “who 
would naturally take possession of the land of a tenant unable to perform 
his feudal duties”.11 Such persons were known as “lunatics” (persons who 
had become mentally disordered and so lost mental capacity) or “fools” 
8. Jacob, below note 20; see also Keith Mason, “The Inherent Jurisdiction 
of the Court” (1983) 57 Australian Law Journal 449; MS Dockray, 
“The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings” (1997) 113 
Law Quarterly Review 120 (“[t]here is no clear agreement on what [the 
inherent jurisdiction] is, where it came from, which courts and tribunals 
have it and what it can be used for” at 120) [Dockray]; see also Shreem 
Holdings Inc v Barr Picard, 2014 ABQB 112 (“[j]ust as the existence of 
the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts is indisputable and certain, 
the theoretical basis and scope of it are debatable” at para 26) [Shreem 
Holdings].
9. TA Cromwell, “Aspects of Constitutional Judicial Review in Canada” 
(1994-1995) 46 South Carolina Law Review 1031; see e.g. Dominion 
Canners Ltd v Costanza, [1923] SCR 46 at para 61; In re Sproule, [1886] 
12 SCR 140.
10. [1986] 2 SCR 308 [Re Eve].
11. Ibid at para 32, the case involved a mother’s application requesting that 
the court consent to the sterlisation of her mentally incapable daughter as 
an exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction. The mental health legislation 
in the province at the time did not provide for substitute consent to the 
procedure. The Court declined to exercise the jurisdiction on the basis 
that it had not been established that it was in Eve’s best interests.
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(persons who had never had mental capacity).12 As described in Re Eve, the 
court’s “wardship” jurisdiction in relation to children became merged or 
“assimilated” over time with this jurisdiction over “mental incompetents” 
to comprise the parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of both vulnerable 
population groups.13 The jurisdiction “continues to this day” (so long as it 
has not been supplanted by legislation) and remains applicable in specific 
situations not contemplated by legislation.14 So long as the parens patriae 
jurisdiction is exercised in the best interests of the individual:
the situations under which it can be exercised are legion … and the categories 
under which the jurisdiction can be exercised are never closed … the 
jurisdiction is a carefully guarded one. The courts will not readily assume that 
it [the parens patriae jurisdiction] has been removed by legislation where a 
necessity arises to protect a person who cannot protect himself. … Simply put, 
the discretion is to do what is necessary for the protection of the person for 
whose benefit it is exercised.15
Sir James Munby, writing about parens patriae in connection with the 
development of the new jurisdiction in England, located the origins of 
parens patriae in the prerogative powers of the medieval kings to take 
“responsibility for those without the capacity to look after themselves”.16 
In Munby’s account, the ancient power was “put on a statutory footing” 
with the creation of the Court of Wards and Liveries in 1540 which had 
jurisdiction over both children and the mentally incapable.17 That court 
was abolished in 1646 and following the Restoration the jurisdictions 
12. Munby, supra note 1 at 66.
13. Re Eve, supra note 10 at paras 40, 42 (“Lord Somers resembled the 
jurisdiction over infants, to the care which the Court takes with respect to 
lunatics, and supposed that the jurisdiction devolved on the Crown, in the 
same way” at para 42).
14. See Beson v Director of Child Welfare (Nfld), [1982] 2 SCR 716; Re Eve, 
supra note 10 (“[e]ven where there is legislation in the area, the courts will 
continue to use the parens patriae jurisdiction to deal with uncontemplated 
situations where it appears necessary to do so for the protection of those who 
fall within its ambit” at para 42).
15. Re Eve, supra note 10 at paras 74-75 (the jurisdiction was therefore 
“founded on necessity, namely the need to act for the protection of those 
who cannot care for themselves” at para 75).
16. Munby, supra note 1 at 66.
17. Ibid.
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were separated: the parens patriae jurisdiction with relation to “infants” 
returned to the Chancery; the Crown’s parens patriae power with relation 
to persons of “unsound mind” was assigned to specific individuals 
(initially to the Lord Chancellor). In 1956, the power was assigned 
by warrant to the Lord Chancellor and to the judges of the Court of 
Chancery. That warrant was revoked in England in 1960, on the coming 
into force of the Mental Health Act 1959,18 effectively removing the parens 
patriae jurisdiction in respect of incompetent persons in England and 
creating the “gap” at issue in In Re F (a gap that was subsequently filled 
by legislation). In contrast, the parens patriae jurisdiction with respect 
to incapable adults, as discussed in Re Eve, was not removed in this way 
(or “swept away” in the language of the House of Lords in In Re F) in 
Canada.
B. The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court
“Just as the existence of the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts 
is indisputable and certain, the theoretical basis and scope of it are 
debatable”.19
The inherent jurisdiction was described by Master IH Jacob as “a 
residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary 
whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure 
the observance of due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or 
oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial 
18. (UK), 7 & 8 Eliz II, c 72.
19. Shreem Holdings, supra note 8 at para 26; see also Dockray, supra note 8 
(“[t]here is no clear agreement on what it [the inherent jurisdiction] is, 
where it came from, which courts and tribunals have it and what it can be 
used for” at 20).
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between them”.20 These powers are derived 
not from any statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court 
as a superior court of law … This description has been criticised as being 
‘metaphysical’ … but I think nevertheless that it is apt to describe the quality 
of this jurisdiction. For the essential character of a superior court of law 
necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its 
authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused. Such a power 
is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its 
immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but 
would lack substance. The jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of 
law is that which enables it to fulfil itself as a court of law.21
The Supreme Court of Canada, drawing on Master Jacob’s definition, 
has described the inherent jurisdiction as both “inexhaustibly” various 
and as a “narrow core” of powers. Justice Binnie, quoting Master Jacob, 
observed in R v Caron22 (“Caron”) that the inherent jurisdiction may 
be invoked in “an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances and 
may be exercised in different ways … even in respect of matters which 
20. IH Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current 
Legal Problems 23 at 51 [Jacob] cited in R v Caron, 2011 SCC 5 at para 
24 [Caron] (Jacob’s article has been cited on nine separate occasions by 
the Supreme Court of Canada: Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick 
Inc v Association of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls District 
50 Branch), [1986] 1 SCR 549 at para 95 per Justice Wilson (granting 
leave to appeal to a non-party); BCGEU v British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [1988] 2 SCR 214 at para 49 (issuing injunction on the 
court’s own motion to guarantee access to court facilities); R v Morales, 
[1992] 3 SCR 711 at para 87 per Justice Gonthier (discretion regarding 
bail); R v Hinse, [1995] 4 SCR 597 at para 21 per Chief Justice Lamer 
(stay of criminal proceedings for abuse of process); MacMillan Bloedel v 
Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 at paras 29-31 per Lamer CJ (punishing for 
contempt out of court) [MacMillan]; R v Rose, [1998] 3 SCR 262 at paras 
64, 131 per Justice L’Heureux-Dubé and Justices Cory, Iacobucci and 
Bastarache, respectively (discretion to grant a right of reply in a criminal 
trial); R v Cunningham, [2010] 1 SCR 331 at para 18 (authority to refuse 
defence counsel’s request to withdraw); Ontario v Criminal Lawyers 
Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 (“[t]he inherent jurisdiction of the 
court is limited by institutional roles and capacities” at para 24) [Criminal 
Lawyers]).
21. Jacob, supra note 20 at 27 cited in MacMillan, ibid at para 20.
22. Caron, supra note 20.
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are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long as it [the jurisdiction] 
can do so without contravening any statutory provision”.23 A “categories 
approach” to the inherent jurisdiction, he concluded, was therefore 
inappropriate although this “very plenitude” required that the “inherent 
jurisdiction be exercised sparingly and with caution”.24 
Chief Justice Lamer, in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson25 
(“MacMillan”) described a “core” or “inherent” jurisdiction that is beyond 
the reach of Parliament and the provincial legislatures in the absence of 
constitutional amendment”.26 This “core”, he concluded, was made up of 
the court’s “essential and immanent attributes” (quoting Master Jacob) 
and therefore to “[r]emove any part of [it] emasculates the court, making 
it something other than a superior court”.27 The content of that “core” is 
described in the case as comprising “those powers which are essential to the 
administration of justice and the maintenance of the rule of law”.28 Justice 
Karakatsanis, giving the reasons for the majority in Ontario v Criminal 
Lawyers Association of Ontario,29 described the “core” as “a very narrow 
one which includes only critically important jurisdictions which are 
essential to the existence of a superior court of inherent jurisdiction and 
to the preservation of its foundational role within our legal system”.30
23. Jacob, supra note 20 at 23-24 cited in Caron, ibid at paras 29, 32.
24. Caron, ibid at para 30.
25. MacMillan, supra note 20 (giving reasons for the majority).
26. Ibid at para 8 (referring to the reasons given by Chief Justice McEachern 
in the British Columbia Supreme Court).
27. Ibid (“[t]he full range of powers which comprise the inherent jurisdiction of 
a superior court are, together, its ‘essential character’ or ‘immanent attribute’. 
To remove any part of this core emasculates the court, making it something 
other than a superior court” at para 30).
28. Ibid (“[i]t is unnecessary in this case to enumerate the precise powers which 
compose inherent jurisdiction, as the power to punish for contempt ex 
facie [at issue in the Simpson case] is obviously within that jurisdiction. The 
power to punish for all forms of contempt is one of the defining features of 
superior courts” at para 38).
29. Criminal Lawyers, supra note 20.
30. Ibid at para 19, per Justice Karakatsanis (giving the reasons for the 
majority, quoting from Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies 
Act (NS), [1996] 1 SCR 186 at para 56 per Lamer CJ). 
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At once “inexhaustibly various” and “very narrow”, William H 
Charles concluded that “one might have thought” that “to attempt a 
definition … of such a mysterious and unruly concept … would involve 
a mission impossible”.31 Rosara Joseph has suggested that “the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court was better understood as being comprised 
of a number of separate jurisdictions, which have developed piecemeal 
and mostly in isolation” (rather than an “amorphous single source of 
jurisdiction”).32 These “jurisdictions” are identified by Joseph as including 
“parens patriae, punishment for contempt of court, judicial review, bail 
and jurisdiction over officers of the Court” and the “more shadowy 
category of inherent jurisdiction: the Court’s jurisdiction to revisit its 
own ‘null’ decisions”.33 
The apparently contradictory and “unruly” nature of the inherent 
jurisdiction may be resolved if the jurisdiction is understood as a single 
source from which two different kinds of powers may flow, powers which 
may subsequently be developed through the case law to comprise distinct 
jurisdictions34 including those described by Joseph (with the exception 
of parens patriae, the origins of which lie in a very different source as 
described above). The first kind of powers flowing from the inherent 
jurisdiction source are those powers “essential to the administration of 
justice and the maintenance of the rule of law” as described in MacMillan.35 
These “core” powers, pertaining to the self-governance functions of the 
court, are essential to the court’s identity and as such are constitutionally 
protected. The inherent jurisdiction, as a residual source of power, may 
also be drawn upon “as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do 
so” (to quote Master Jacob) to generate non-core exercises of power “as 
31. William H Charles, “Inherent Jurisdiction and Its Application in Nova 
Scotia Courts: Metaphysical, Historical or Pragmatic?” (2010) 33 
Dalhousie Law Journal 63 at 66.
32. Rosara Joseph, “Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers in New 
Zealand” (2005) 11 Canterbury Law Review at 220.
33. Ibid.
34. This approach is consistent with Master Jacob’s description of the inherent 
jurisdiction as a “residual source of powers” and with Justice Binnie’s 
rejection of the kind of “categories-approach” suggested by Joseph.
35. MacMillan, supra note 20 at para 38. 
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and when the need arises”.36 These non-core powers may subsequently be 
reduced or even replaced by legislation without “emasculating” the court; 
in such a case the actions of the legislature will remove the “necessity” for 
the inherent jurisdiction to be used in a particular way. It is therefore right 
for the power (derived from the inherent jurisdiction source) to recede. 
Through the development of this second kind of power, the inherent 
jurisdiction acts as a “great safety net” to be expanded or retracted in 
connection with legislation and through which the superior court 
exercises its “metaphysical” function: to prevent “improper vexation or 
oppression” and to effect justice and equity between the parties.
The first set of cases discussed below show the courts drawing on the 
“source” of the inherent jurisdiction to apply the common law doctrine 
of necessity in a series of increasingly “new” circumstances using the 
declaration as a means of doing so. The second set of cases discussed 
below show the courts developing that power further as a means of 
implementing the principles of equitable fraud outside of the traditional 
transactional and testamentary contexts. Crucial in both sets of cases 
is the existence of a justice gap caused by the absence of legislation; 
as demonstrated in these cases, the inherent jurisdiction provides the 
authority and the means (the declaration) on the basis of which such gaps 
must be filled by the courts, drawing on the principles of equity and the 
common law to do so. The power drawn from the inherent jurisdiction 
must retreat where the gap has been filled by legislation, as in the kinds of 
circumstances at issue in the necessity cases, discussed below.
II. The Cases: In Re F and After
A. In Re F
In the case of In Re F, the House of Lords interpreted and applied the 
common law doctrine of necessity to fill a gap left by the disappearance 
of parens patriae in relation to mentally incapable adults. The court drew 
on the inherent jurisdiction of the court, as a residual source of power, to 
enable the principled exercise of that doctrine through the mechanism of 
36. Dockray, supra note 8 at 124.
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the declaration. 
In Re F concerned a “momentous and irrevocable”37 medical decision 
with significant public policy implications: whether a sterilisation 
procedure could be lawfully performed on a mentally disabled woman, 
“F”. F was unable to consent to the procedure by reason of her disability, 
nor could anyone else consent on F’s behalf (the applicable mental health 
legislation did not provide for substitute consent to the procedure).38 The 
medial professionals involved in F’s care, together with F’s mother, agreed 
that pregnancy and birth would be a “disaster” and “catastrophic” for F; 
and F (through her mother) asked the court either to provide consent 
to the procedure or to make a declaration that the procedure could be 
lawfully performed without consent.39 The parens patriae jurisdiction of 
the court applying to mentally incompetent adults (which would have 
provided a basis on which the court could consent to the operation) had 
been “swept away”40 by legislative reform some years before, leaving no 
basis on which the court could give consent to the procedure.
The House of Lords, like the Court of Appeal before it,41 found that 
the procedure proposed (being in the best interests of F) was justified 
on the basis of the common law doctrine of necessity, which essentially 
provided a policy-based rationale for dispensing with the requirement 
of consent where an interference that would otherwise comprise a 
trespass (to person or property) is “justified summa necessitate, by the 
37. See Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction), [1996] Fam 1 (CA (Civ)
(Eng)) at para 4.
38. In Re F, supra note 3 at 22 citing Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 1 WLR 
1172 (QB (Eng))(without consent, medical treatment (like any other 
interference with the body of another) would constitute a trespass to the 
person: the tort of battery).
39. In Re F, supra note 3 at 2-3.
40. In Re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation), [1988] AC 199 (HL)(Lord 
Brandon noted that no difficulty would arise regarding the Court’s current 
jurisdiction to consent to the procedure if F were a minor suffering from 
a comparable mental disability, in which case the court would exercise its 
wardship jurisdiction to make a decision based on the best interests of the 
minor).
41. Re F (Sterilization: Mental Patient), [1989] 2 FLR 376 (HL).
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immediate urgency of the occasion, and a due regard for the public 
safety or convenience”.42 Necessity provided a justification for medical 
treatment without consent in situations of emergency, as where a surgeon 
amputated the limb of an unconscious passenger to free him from the 
wreckage of a railway accident. F, as a person with a disability, could not 
coherently be regarded as existing in a “permanent state of emergency”, 
but a “clear and logical connection” did exist between the position of a 
person unable to consent by reason of emergency and a person unable to 
consent by reason of lasting mental incapacity.43 In both cases, disallowing 
medical treatment that was in a patient’s best interests would effectively 
deprive that person of the care that he or she would receive if able to give 
consent; that deprivation was more meaningful to the individual than the 
corresponding abrogation of the right to non-interference protected by 
the doctrine of trespass.44 It was the court’s obligation to fill the gap left 
by the legislature’s removal of parens patriae. Using the common law (the 
“great safety net which lies behind all statute law”)45 to “fill gaps, if and in 
so far as these gaps have to be filled in the interests of society as a whole” 
was described by Justice Donaldson in the Court of Appeal as “one of the 
most important duties of judges”.46 
Lord Goff of Chiveley distinguished between situations of true 
emergency (the unconscious passenger in a railway accident) and 
situations involving a “permanent or semi-permanent state of affairs”.47 
Necessity justified intervention in both situations, but the permissible 
scope of intervention was different in each. The medical intervenor in 
a true emergency situation could lawfully do no more than what was 
reasonably required in the best interests of the patient until the patient 
regained the ability to consent. This limitation had no rational basis 
where the “state of affairs” precluding consent was “permanent or semi-
permanent”: a person in this situation will likely never be able to consent 
42. Morey v Fitzgerald (1884), 56 Vt 487 (Sup Ct (Vermont)) at 489.
43. In Re F, supra note 3 at 17.
44. Mallette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417 (CA).
45. In Re F, supra note 3 at 13.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid at 25. 
199(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
or, if so, will only be able to do so after a lengthy and indeterminate 
period of time. In the meantime: 
the need to care for [such a patient] is obvious and the doctor must then act in 
the best interests of his patient, just as if he had received his patient’s consent 
to do so. Were this not so, much useful treatment and care could, in theory at 
least, be denied to the unfortunate.48 
Unlike the emergency situation, “humdrum” or “routine” care, including 
“simple care such as dressing and undressing and putting to bed”,49 
would also be justified on the basis of necessity (with no requirement of 
legal authorisation) where the inability to consent was a permanent or 
semi-permanent state.
A majority in the House of Lords, as in the Court of Appeal, found 
that the sterilisation procedure was justified on the basis of necessity 
and therefore lawful without the approval of the court (in the same 
way that approval was not required before emergency treatment could 
be lawfully given). Nevertheless, the special nature of the procedure, 
involving potentially competing interests (between F, her mother, and the 
physicians) and the fundamental personal rights of F engaged, made the 
involvement of the court desirable (and also practicable, as no emergency 
“on the spot” medical decision making was required). The Court of 
Appeal had concluded that a new rule of court, requiring a determination 
by the court that a procedure of this kind was in the best interests of the 
patient, was needed. A mere declaration that the operation would be 
lawful would “change nothing” and merely declare that “had a course of 
action been taken without resort to the court, it would have been lawful 
anyway”.50 This was inadequate: 
[i]n the context of the most sensitive and potentially controversial forms 
of treatment the public interest requires that the courts should give express 
48. Ibid at 26.
49. Ibid (“[w]hen the state of affairs is permanent, or semi-permanent, 
action properly taken to preserve the life, health or well-being of the 
assisted person may well transcend such measures as surgical operation or 
substantial medical treatment and may extend to include such humdrum 
matters as routine medical or dental treatment, even simple care such as 
dressing and undressing and putting to bed” at 26).
50. Ibid at 9.
200 
 
Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction
approval before the treatment is carried out and thereby provide an independent 
and broad based third opinion.51 
In the meantime (pending formulation of this new rule) the court was 
“fortunately” able to draw on its “inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own 
proceedings”, which meant that approval of the court was required before 
the sterilisation could proceed.52 
The House of Lords held that the court had no jurisdiction to create 
the new rule proposed by the Court of Appeal, as this would effectively 
replicate the parens patriae jurisdiction with respect to mentally incapable 
adults that the legislature had removed: 
[i]f [the parens patriae jurisdiction], or something comparable to it, is to be 
re-created, then it must be for the legislature and not for the courts to do the 
re-creating. Rules of Court can only, as a matter of law … prescribe the practice 
and procedure to be followed by the court when it is exercising a jurisdiction 
which already exists. They cannot confer jurisdiction, and, if they purported to 
do so, they would be ultra vires.53 
A declaration could not be required in a situation of this kind,54 but it was 
“open to the court under its inherent jurisdiction to make a declaration 
that a proposed operation was in a patient’s best interests” and in the 
current case it was “highly desirable”55 that such a declaration should 
be sought by those caring for the woman. A declaration would, as Lord 
Donaldson noted, “change nothing” in the sense that it could not “make 
lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful”.56 A declaration would 
establish by judicial process, however, “whether the proposed operation 
is in the best interests of the patient and therefore lawful, or not in 
the patient’s best interests and therefore unlawful”.57 In order to make 
51. Ibid at 13.
52. Ibid at 10.
53. Ibid at 12, per Lord Brandon of Oakwood.
54. Ibid (“[t]he rule [pertaining to the court’s power to make declarations] 
does no more than say that there is no procedural objection to an action 
being brought for a declaration whether any other kind of relief is asked 
for or available or not” at 13).
55. Ibid at 5.
56. Ibid at 23.
57. Ibid at 13, per Lord Brandon of Oakwood.
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a declaration of lawfulness (because it is in the patient’s best interests), 
the court would be obliged to make an inquiry and “reasoned decision” 
about those best interests, “substantially the same” process as if the court’s 
approval were required through a new rule.58 In effect, the mechanism of 
the declaration would provide the “independent and broad based third 
opinion” sought by the Court of Appeal through the new rule. “If the 
old parens patriae jurisdiction were still available … there would be no 
difficulty”, Lord Brandon noted:
[but] having regard to the present limitations on the jurisdiction of the court, 
by which I mean its inability to exercise the parens patriae jurisdiction with 
respect to adults of unsound mind, the procedure by way of declaration is, in 
principle, an appropriate and satisfactory procedure to be used in a case of this 
kind”.59 
Lord Goff concluded that there seemed “little, if any, practical difference 
between seeking the court’s approval under the parens patriae jurisdiction 
and seeking a declaration as to the lawfulness of the operation”.60 
In the opinion of Lord Griffiths, the involvement of the court in 
these circumstances was not only desirable, but should be required, not 
by a rule of court, but by the doctrine of necessity itself. “The law ought 
to be that [medical providers] must obtain the approval of the court 
before they sterilise a woman incapable of giving consent. I believe that it 
is open to your Lordships to develop a common law rule to this effect”.61 
The common law had proved sufficiently flexible in the past to develop 
public interest based exceptions to the general rule “that the individual 
is the master of his own fate” by placing “constraints on the harm that 
people may consent to being inflicted on their own bodies”.62 “The time 
has now come”, Lord Griffith concluded, “for a further development to 
forbid, again in the public interest, the sterilisation of a woman with 
healthy reproductive organs who, either through mental incompetence 
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid at 14. 
60. Ibid at 32.
61. Ibid at 19-20.
62. Ibid at 20 citing Attorney General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980), [1981] QB 
715 (CA (Crim)(Eng)); Rex v Donovan, [1934] 2 KB 498 (CA (Crim)
(Eng)).
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or youth, is incapable of giving her fully informed consent unless such an 
operation has been enquired into and sanctioned by the High Court”.63 
As “second best” to a new common law rule, Lord Griffith accepted the 
declaration procedure described by Lords Brandon and Goff.
B. After In Re F: Developing the Inherent Jurisdiction
A series of cases following In Re F applied the interpretation of necessity 
developed in that case (itself an extension through analogy of the necessity 
justification in emergency settings to non-emergency medical treatment 
for persons unable to consent by reason of mental disability) to justify 
both medical and non-medical interventions. In both medical and non-
medical settings, intervention could be justified on the basis of necessity 
only if in the best interests of the individual; outside of the medical context 
this has been interpreted as a requirement that intervention is necessary 
for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of an individual who, by reason 
of mental incapability, is incapable of doing so herself. The mechanism 
of the declaration was used in both contexts to enable a “third opinion” 
on the question of whether the intervention proposed was in the best 
interests of the individual concerned and, therefore, lawful. 
Sir Stephen Brown, in a case involving a mentally incapable person 
(to whom the old parens patriae jurisdiction would have applied) and 
“special category”64 medical treatment, described the inherent jurisdiction 
“discovered” in In Re F as a “patrimonial” jurisdiction, “not strictly parens 
patriae but similar in all practical respects to it”.65 In In Re S (Adult 
Patient: Sterilisation)66 (another case, like In Re F, involving a mentally 
incapable patient and a proposed sterilisation procedure), Lord Thorpe 
referred to the relationship between this “patrimonial jurisdiction” and 
parens patriae as: 
a distinction without a difference … By which I mean that the parens patriae 
jurisdiction is only the term of art for the wardship jurisdiction which is 
alternatively described as the inherent jurisdiction. That which is patrimonial 
63. In Re F, supra note 3 at 20.
64. Involving competing interests, fundamental rights and the public interest.
65. Re G (Adult Patient: Publicity), [1995] 2 FLR 528 (Fam (Eng)) at 530.
66. [2001] Fam 15 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
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is that which is inherited from the ancestral past. It therefore follows that 
whilst the decision in Re F signposted the inadvertent loss of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults, the alternative jurisdiction 
which it established, the declaratory decree, was to be exercised upon the same 
basis, namely that relief would be granted if the welfare of the patient required 
it and equally refused if the welfare of the patient did not.67
The distinction between the necessity-based declaration and the old 
parens patriae emerges with greater clarity in a subsequent series of cases 
concerning the rights and best interests of incapable individuals outside 
of the medical context. 
In Re C (Adult Patient) 68 (“Access: Jurisdiction”) concerned a situation 
where one parent was restricting the access of another to their mentally 
disabled adult child (who was herself unable to consent to or to refuse 
the restriction). Justice Eastham found that the child had a common law 
right to freedom of association and that the conduct of the parent was 
in violation of that right. A declaration in such a case could be granted. 
It would not work to make the restriction of access illegal, but simply 
recognise it as such (because it was in violation of the adult child’s right). 
In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) 69 concerned a patient (“S”) 
who had become mentally incapable following a stroke. S was currently 
being cared for in a hospital in England, where he had lived for many 
years, but his estranged wife now wished to move S to Norway. S’s long 
term English mistress sought a declaration from the court, on the basis 
of its inherent jurisdiction, that it would be unlawful to remove S from 
England. This case raised the question of who was entitled to bring an 
application for a declaration on the basis of the rights of a mentally 
incapable person who was unable to consent to the intervention.70 The 
mistress in In Re S, unlike the parent in In Re C, did not have a recognised 
legal basis on which to seek the declaration with regard to the rights of S. 
The court held that the jurisdiction could be invoked by any party whose 
past or present relation with the incapable person gave him a genuine 
and legitimate interest in obtaining a decision (and not a “stranger” or 
67. Ibid at 29-30.
68. [1994] 1 FCR 705 (Fam (Eng)) [In Re C].
69. [1996] Fam 1 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
70. Pending a determination of S’s best interest.
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“officious busybody”) and that the matter in question — S’s residence — 
was one in respect of which a declaration of lawfulness could be made.71 
In Cambridgeshire County Council v R and Others,72 an application for a 
declaration was brought by a local authority (as a body with a legitimate 
interest in the rights of “R”). The application was not successful for two 
reasons. First, it had not been established that R was incapable of making 
her own decision about the proposed intervention (and therefore the 
doctrine of necessity did not apply);73 second, it had not been established 
what rights of R, if any, were in need of safeguarding.74 R was a 20 year 
old woman with a learning disability who had been taken into care at the 
age of 10. R’s father had been sentenced to four years’ imprisonment after 
admitting to serious sexual offences committed against R when she was a 
child; the other members of R’s family, including her mother, had always 
denied that the offences took place. At the time the application was 
brought, R was living in supported accommodation provided by the local 
authority. The authority was now worried that R’s mother was trying to 
persuade R to leave her current housing and return to live with her family 
— a move the authority believed would have very negative consequences 
for R. The authority asked the court, on the basis of necessity and the 
inherent jurisdiction recognized in In Re F, to make a declaration that the 
authority could lawfully prevent R’s family from removing or attempting 
to remove R from her present accommodation and from contacting R 
without the authority’s consent. 
The local authority had maintained that R was not capable of making 
this decision, proposing that the following test of decision-making 
capability was appropriate in this case:
i. if unsupervised contact would be damaging to R’s welfare, 
ii. the court should consider the intention likely to be held by a 
person of proper understanding in respect of it, and 
iii. if such a person would be likely to object to it, then 
71. In Re C, supra note 68 at 2.
72. [1994] 2 FCR 973 (Fam (Eng)).
73. Ibid at 975.
74. Ibid.
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iv. (on the assumption that the right not to have contact is a right 
protected by the common law) the law should afford a person 
who is not legally competent the same protection as it would 
afford the legally competent.75 
Rejecting this test, Lady Hale observed: 
[t]hat it provides no help in deciding who is or is not legally competent 
and comes dangerously close to asserting that someone who decides to do 
things which others consider are not in their best interests is for that very 
reason incompetent. That has never been the law in this country. The test of 
competence in other areas has always been the capacity to understand the 
nature and effect of the transaction or other action proposed.76 
Furthermore, Lady Hale described the declaration sought as one which 
would effectively transform a lawful activity (R’s communication with 
her family members) into an unlawful one, and not a “mere” declaration 
of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the activity in question:
[i]t is necessary to ask what legal right there is for R to be protected against 
the actions which the local authority seeks to control or prohibit in this case, 
and also what legal right the authority has to be appointed in effect as her 
protector. It is access, or freedom of association, rather than harassment, or 
freedom from association, which is protected under English law. … Far from 
supporting a legal right, the declarations sought would interfere with one, 
and in circumstances in which it has not been argued before me that a legal 
justification for doing so exists.77 
Six years later, a similar situation was considered in Re F (Adult: Court’s 
Jurisdiction).78 Re F concerned a young girl (“T”), now 18, who was 
described as having an intellectual age of 5 to 8 years old. T had been 
placed in local authority accommodation for persons with mental 
disabilities at the age of 16 with the consent of her mother. Prior to that, 
T’s home life with her parents was described as abusive and neglectful 
(such that the local authority eventually placed T’s seven younger siblings 
in care). The mother had subsequently withdrawn her consent to T’s 
accommodation placement; T had also expressed a desire to live with 
her mother. When T turned 18 the local authority had succeeded in 
75. Ibid at 977.
76. Ibid at 975-76.
77. Ibid at 976-77.
78. [2000] EWCA Civ 192 [Re F].
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obtaining an order for guardianship, but that order was overturned by 
the Court of Appeal79 on the basis that recent legislative amendments had 
“radically restricted” the “categories of people who could be received into 
guardianship” excluding persons in the position of T:
[g]uardianship cannot now be used for clients who suffer from any form or 
arrested or incomplete development of the mind unless it is associated with 
“abnormally aggressive” or “seriously irresponsible” conduct. Unless the 
meaning of these words is distorted, the vast majority of those with a learning 
disability (mental handicap) will be excluded from guardianship. The benign 
side of the guardianship coin was nowhere in evidence in the new legislation. 
The present state of the statute books therefore reflects a single-minded view of 
personal guardianship as a method of restricting civil rights and liberties rather 
than as a method of enhancing them.80
Applying this restrictive construction of the legislation to T, her desire to 
return to the family home was not “seriously irresponsible” in the sense 
required, and the guardianship order was overturned. 
The local authority now sought a declaration on the basis of the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court that it could lawfully restrict T’s contact 
with her natural family (principally her mother) and that T should 
remain in the local authority accommodation. The court found that T 
was not capable of making the decision of whether to have contact with 
her family (unlike R in the Cambridgeshire County Council case) and 
that doing so would be deleterious to her rights (which T was unable to 
protect herself ). Lord Sedley opined that “T is so unable to judge what 
is in her own best interests that no humane society could leave her adrift 
and at risk simply because she has reached the age of 18”.81 T’s situation 
was, in this sense, analogous to that of the young woman in In Re F: 
unable (in the opinion of the court) to make the crucial decision herself 
with no-one able to consent on her behalf (the guardianship order in 
respect of T having been overturned). 
As in In Re F, the court found that the common law doctrine of 
79. Re F (Mental Health Act: Guardianship), [2000] 1 FCR 11 (CA (Civ)
(Eng)).
80. Ibid at 17, citing UK, Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law 
Commission Report 231)(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1995) at para 2.2.1.
81. Re F, supra note 78 at 48.
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necessity was the basis on which the court could make the declaration 
that was being sought. “If there is no recourse to the doctrine of necessity, 
the court has no jurisdiction to make any declarations to enable the local 
authority to … regulate future arrangements for T”.82 In In Re F, necessity 
“filled the gap” left by the disappearance of parens patriae regarding the 
decision in question without legislative replacement. This case raised the 
question of whether an analogous gap was created by the legislature’s 
“radical restriction” of guardianship legislation (prior to which the local 
authority could have acted as T’s guardian) or whether the legislature had 
intended to create a law-free space for individual autonomous choice (a 
space to remain un-filled rather than a gap). Would the court, in making 
the declaration requested, be “assuming an inherent power to restore 
what parliament had removed” through its “deliberate and wholesale 
curtailment” of guardianship?
The court concluded that the reform of guardianship legislation had 
created 
[a]n obvious gap in the framework for care of mentally incapacitated adults. 
If the court cannot act and the local authority is right [regarding the abusive 
home environment] this vulnerable young woman would be left at serious risk 
with no recourse to protection, other than the future possibility of the criminal 
law. This is a serious injustice to T who has rights which she is, herself, unable 
to protect. … [quoting Lord Donaldson at the Court of Appeal in In Re F] 
The common law is the great safety net which lies behind all statute law and is 
capable of filling gaps in that law, if and inso far as those gaps have to be filled 
in the interests of society.83 
The restriction of the legislation, coupled with T’s inability to protect 
her own interests, meant that, without the intervention sought by the 
local authority, T would be effectively deprived of rights to which she 
would otherwise be entitled (either because T could have protected her 
rights independently or because a guardian could have done so on T’s 
behalf ). Lord Justice Thorpe concluded his reasons by cautioning that 
his judgment should not be understood as “restoring more or less the 
parens patriae jurisdiction, albeit re-labelled”,84 referring to Lord Goff’s 
82. Ibid at 39.
83. Ibid at 41-42.
84. Ibid at 47.
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discussion in In Re F of the “wider range” of care justified by necessity 
in cases involving persons with permanent or semi-permanent mental 
disorder (the implication being that the contact restrictions were an 
extension of the kind of non-medical “hum-drum” or everyday care 
decisions Lord Goff described).
In Re A Local Authority (A Restraint on Publication)85 concerned a 
group of individuals characterised as “vulnerable” and “adults under a 
disability”. The mental capability of these individuals, or lack thereof, 
is never established, although they are treated by the court as mentally 
incapable persons to whom the In Re F jurisdiction applies (and to whom 
the parens patriae jurisdiction would have applied prior to its demise).86 
This case is an important turning point in the development of the 
jurisdiction through the case law. Unlike the previous cases discussed, the 
doctrine of necessity and declaration mechanism are used here to justify 
a protective order — an injunction — and not merely to declare the 
lawfulness (or unlawfulness) of a proposed course of action.
The “adults under a disability” whose rights were in issue in this case 
had all lived in a particular foster home as children and had returned 
to live in the home as adults. The foster home had been the subject of 
an inquiry carried out by the local authority, and the public solicitor 
representing these “vulnerable” adults now sought a ban on publication 
of the inquiry report on the grounds that the ensuing media scrutiny 
would cause upset and stress.87 Dame Butler-Sloss agreed,88 noting that, 
85. [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam).
86. Ibid at paras 86-97.
87. Ibid at paras 41-42.
88. Ibid (“[t]hey have now returned to live at the Home. They have had 
consideration and distressing disruption of their lived and are, as set out 
in the Report, vulnerable. A period of peace, stability and a chance to 
settle down again after the very real upset of their lives is threatened by the 
likely intense media cover if this Report is published. They are all under 
some disability but not such, as far as I know, as to prevent possibly all of 
them, but certainly at least 4 of them, from understanding the impact of 
press and other media intrusion. That intrusion would affect their daily 
lives and would be very likely to be disruptive, distressing and contrary to 
the need for them to settle back in the Home” at para 98).
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following the decision in In Re F:
the circumstances within which a court will exercise the inherent jurisdiction 
through the common law doctrine of necessity are not restricted to granting 
declarations in medical issues. It is a flexible remedy and adaptable to ensure 
the protection of a person who is under a disability. It has been extended to 
questions of residence and contact. Until there is legislation passed which will 
protect and oversee the welfare of those under a permanent disability the courts 
have a duty to continue, as Lord Donaldson said in  Re F  (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation), to use the common law as the great safety net to fill gaps where it 
is clearly necessary to do so.89
The new question in this case was whether the inherent jurisdiction could 
be exercised for the purposes of making a positive order that would ban 
publication of the report (justified on the basis of necessity):
[i]n the previous cases about adults under a disability, the issues have been 
the lawfulness of the proposed course of action and considerations as to their 
best interests. That cannot be the correct approach in the present case. The 
application of the inherent jurisdiction would seem more appropriately to 
be treated as the exercise of a protective jurisdiction rather than a custodial 
jurisdiction.90
Dame Butler-Sloss granted an injunction preventing the authority from 
publishing the report.
The “flexible” remedy described in In Re A Local Authority was 
developed further in Re G (An Adult),91 in which the court relaxed (if it did 
not yet abandon) the requirement of mental incapability which, through 
analogy to the inability to consent in emergency medical situations, had 
provided the conceptual basis for the application of the common law 
doctrine of necessity from In Re F onwards. 
Re G concerned a young woman (“G”) who was not mentally 
incapable at the time the application was brought, although she had been 
incapable in the past by reason of her mental illness. G’s condition had 
stabilised under psychiatric care and for the last ten years she had been 
residing in supportive housing provided by the local authority. The local 
authority now sought a declaration that it could lawfully restrict contact 
89. Ibid at para 96.
90. Ibid at para 97.
91. [2004] EWHC 2222 (Fam) [Re G].
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between G and her father.92 G’s father had been violent towards G and 
her mother in the past and the local authority was concerned about the 
strongly negative impact that contact with her father had on G. Following 
a previous period of contact with her father, G’s condition regressed to 
the point that she became mentally incapable. Justice Bennett agreed 
with the experts involved in G’s care that “[i]f the restrictions [on G’s 
contact with her father] were lifted, G’s mental health would deteriorate 
to such an extent that she would again become incapacitated … Such a 
reversion would be disastrous for G”.93 
Justice Bennett dismissed as “unattractive” the proposition that the 
court’s jurisdiction would be “entirely dependent on the shifting sands 
of whether or not G did, or did not, have the requisite mental capacity 
at a particular time”.94 The doctrine of necessity therefore applied here, 
as in In Re F, to justify the restrictions the authority sought to impose. 
Quoting extensively from In Re F, Bennett J agreed with Lord Justice 
Sedley in that case that the doctrine of necessity was not restricted to 
“medical and similar emergencies”.95 “The concept of necessity has its 
role to play in all branches of our law of obligations — in contract … in 
tort … in restitution … and in our criminal law. It is therefore a concept 
of great importance”.96 The common law doctrine of necessity justified 
the intervention sought by the local authority (restricting G’s contact 
with her father) for the purpose of safeguarding G’s rights — in this case, 
her right to not be deprived of her mental capability:
If the declarations sought are in G’s best interests, the court, by intervening, 
far from depriving G of her right to make decisions…will be ensuring that 
G’s now stable and improving mental health is sustained, that G has the best 
possible chance of continuing to be mentally capable, and of ensuring a quality 
of life that [she had previously been] unable to enjoy.97
92. Ibid at para 1. 
93. Ibid at para 86.
94. Ibid at para 91.
95. Ibid at para 102.
96. Re G, supra note 91 referring to the statement of Lord Goff of Chieveley 
in R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust, [1999] AC 458 
(HL).
97. Ibid at para 104.
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[...]
In my judgement, the common law demands that … the court act by 
investigating, and if it is in G’s best interests, making the declarations sought 
… the ‘focal point of the inquiry must be the situation which … has led to the 
application for declaratory relief under the inherent jurisdiction’.98 
IV. Re SK to DL v A Local Authority: Development of  
the Vulnerability Jurisdiction
A series of cases decided after Re G apply the In Re F declaration (i.e. a 
declaration used as a means of determining the substantive lawfulness of a 
proposed intervention and thereby requiring a determination of whether 
the intervention is in the best interests of the individual) in situations 
involving the rights of individuals who, while identified as “vulnerable”, 
are indisputably mentally capable. The source of vulnerability described 
in each case is an oppressive or exploitative relationship context from 
which the individual cannot separate herself99 and by reason of which 
she cannot safeguard her rights independently. Re G can be seen to form 
a bridge between these later cases and the cases coming before it. The 
ultimate objective of the intervention proposed by the local authority in 
Re G was the prevention of G’s regression to her earlier state of mental 
incapacity; the source of the threat both to G’s physical wellbeing (the 
resurgence of her mental illness) and to her rights (her right to mental 
capability and therefore autonomy) was her relationship with her abusive 
father; the disruption of that relationship was the immediate objective of 
the proposed intervention. 
The missing element of mental incapability in these cases changes the 
legal (common law and equity) basis on which the declaration is made 
in these cases and, thereby, the kind of intervention that can be justified. 
The medical intervention proposed in In Re F was lawful on the basis of 
necessity because F was mentally incapable and for that reason unable 
to consent, with no one else able to consent on her behalf (establishing, 
through analogy to the emergency cases, the common law justification of 
98. Ibid at para 112.
99. All of the cases discussed here involve women.
212 
 
Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction
necessity if the intervention could be shown to be in F’s best interests). 
The cases discussed in the previous section, whether within or outside of 
the medical context, retain the fundamental premise of that analysis: in 
situations where a person’s mental incapacity makes consent impossible, 
and where substitute consent is not available, necessity justifies an 
intervention that is in the person’s best interest (and to which he or she 
would be entitled if able to consent).
The cases discussed in this section could be explained as a further 
development-through-analogy of the In Re F necessity analysis, extending 
the justification of necessity to situations where an oppressive and/or 
exploitative relationship context deprives the individual of her ability to 
consent in a way that is analogous to the incapacity of the unconscious 
train-wreck survivor (the original emergency exception). The analogy to 
emergency medical treatment is stretched thin, however, in a way that is 
inconsistent with the situation of necessity within the wider framework 
of tort law as a limited exception to the rule that the individual is, in 
the words of Lord Griffiths, the “master of her fate”. It has also been 
suggested that the characterisation of a new “vulnerable persons” category 
as equivalent to unconscious victims or permanently consent-disabled 
persons (as described in By Lord Goff in In Re F) reduces the “vulnerable” 
to a bundle of faulty personal characteristics or risk factors and deprives 
individuals so labelled of the free choice to which they would otherwise 
be entitled.100 
I propose that it is more coherent (and less problematic in terms of 
autonomy) to understand these cases as marking a decisive conceptual 
break from the earlier necessity based cases following In Re F. In the case 
of a mentally capable adult in a non-emergency situation, the doctrine 
of necessity (with regards to intervention without consent) does not 
coherently apply. The “lawful” basis of the interventions sought in the cases 
involving vulnerable but capable persons is more correctly understood as 
the equitable doctrine of undue influence and the principles underlying 
it; through the mechanism of the declaration, drawing on the inherent 
100. Michael C Dunn, Isabel CH Clare & Anthony J Holland, “To Empower 
or to Protect? Constructing the ‘Vulnerable Adult’ in English Law and 
Public Policy” (2008) 28:2 Legal Studies 234 at 241.
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jurisdiction of the court, these cases show the court giving effect to the 
principles underlying the doctrine in novel situations101 (as the court 
used the mechanism of the declaration to interpret and give effect to the 
doctrine of necessity in the novel situation presented by In Re F). The use 
of the declaration as a mechanism through which the court may exercise 
its inherent jurisdiction in the way described in In Re F and subsequent 
cases is not limited to situations involving the common law doctrine of 
necessity; rather, the necessity cases provided the context in which this 
particular means of exercising the inherent jurisdiction originated, but to 
which it is not contained. 
The language of “capacity” in the vulnerable-but-capable cases is 
potentially confusing but the mere word “capacity”, like vulnerability, has 
more than a single meaning; the more sensible meaning of “capacity” in 
the context of these cases relates to the nature of free choice as explained 
by the doctrine of undue influence. That idea is not the same as the 
cognitive ability described as “mental capacity” in the necessity cases. The 
fact that the declaration cases applying the doctrine of necessity outside 
of the medical context (discussed in the previous section) also concern 
relationships of oppression/exploitation, is another source of confusion. 
The objective of the proposed interventions in the vulnerable-but-
capable cases is crucially different, however, in a way that is consistent 
with the distinct basis of their “lawfulness”: not the protection of 
rights and interests (as in the necessity-based non-medical cases) but 
the facilitation of free choice through the disruption of oppressive/
exploitative relationship context. 
A. Re SK
With the exception of Re G (involving fluctuating mental capacity), Re 
SK (Proposed Plaintiff)(An Adult by way of her Litigation Friend),102 is the 
first case in which the court, drawing on its inherent jurisdiction, declared 
101. The doctrine of undue influence developed in the transactional context, 
including gifts (and wills), although its theoretical framework has also 
been applied to consent in other contexts; see Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 
SCR 226.
102. [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam).
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as lawful a proposed non-medical intervention regarding an individual 
who, while characterised as vulnerable, was clearly mentally capable.
Re SK involved a female British citizen (“SK”) who, consular officials 
suspected, was being kept in Bangaldesh for the purposes of a forced 
marriage. A solicitor in the Community Liaison Unit at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office brought an application asking that the court 
make an order, on the basis of its inherent jurisdiction, for the purpose of 
“protect[ing] and secur[ing] the well-being and best interests of SK and 
to ensure that she may freely express her wishes concerning her country 
and place of residence and concerning her marital status”.103 The order 
requested would require SK’s family to “assist and allow” SK to visit the 
British High Commission and be interviewed alone. It did not cause SK 
to undergo a marriage ceremony and did not “threaten, intimidate … 
harass” or use violence towards SK.104
There was no doubt that SK was mentally capable; nor had she ever 
been mentally incapable. Nevertheless, Justice Singer concluded that, if 
the “gravely disquieting” information received by the consular offices in 
Bangladesh and London proved to be substantially well-founded,
[t]here would be serious cause for concern about her capacity to control her 
own life and destiny at the moment. This notwithstanding that she is an 
adult and is emancipated, at least in terms of English law, and should not be 
the subject of duress or force or be deprived of the ability to make her own 
decisions.105
If, in truth, she were forced to marry or if, in truth, that is the outcome which 
she may contemplate and fear, then steps taken in furtherance of those ends 
would be a series of acts to which she did not consent. Indeed her very capacity 
to consent would have been overborne by fear, duress or threat. If therefore 
she has been through or faces the prospect of going through a ceremony of 
marriage with which she is, in fact, not in agreement it would be a voidable 
marriage, but nevertheless one which might engender irreparable and severe 
physical and emotional consequences for its victim.106 
The court concluded that “the inherent jurisdiction now, like wardship 
has been, is a sufficiently flexible remedy to evolve in accordance with 
103. Ibid at annex.
104. Ibid at paras 2-4.
105. Ibid at para 3.
106. Ibid at para 4.
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social needs and social values” and granted the order sought.107 
A similar situation was considered one year after Re SK in Re SA 
(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage).108 That case concerned a 
British woman age 18 (“SA”) whose family was of Pakistani Muslim 
origin. SA was profoundly deaf and communicated through British Sign 
Language, which neither of her parents understood; SA’s communication 
with her family was therefore extremely limited as she could not 
understand, lip-read or sign in Punjabi or Urdu (the main languages 
spoken in the family). SA also had significant visual loss in one eye and 
had been assessed as having the intellectual level of a 13 or 14-year-old 
child. The local authority was worried that the family of SA planned to 
arrange, or possibly even force SA into a marriage in Pakistan. SA had 
expressed that she was happy to have an arranged marriage but would 
want to approve her parents’ choice of husband for her. She also wanted 
any future husband to speak English and to come and live in the UK; she 
did not want to go live in Pakistan.109 
SA had recently been assessed by a Forensic Psychologist (working 
for the local authority) as having the mental capacity required for 
marriage. The assessor also noted that if SA married a person who could 
not communicate with her, or if she was moved to an environment where 
she was entirely surrounded by people who could not communicate with 
her, it was very likely that SA would become extremely distressed and 
isolated, posing a significant risk to her future well-being and mental 
health.110 On this basis, the local authority sought an order similar to the 
107. Ibid at para 8.
108. [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam).
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid at para 15. 
216 
 
Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction
order sought and granted in Re SK.111
Sir James Munby, giving judgment in the case, explained the basis 
for exercising the inherent jurisdiction “rediscovered” in In Re F in this 
case.112 While it had always been recognised that the “jurisdiction is 
exercisable in relation to any adult who is for the time being, and whether 
permanently or merely temporarily, either disabled by mental incapacity 
from making his own decision or, although not mentally incapacitated, 
unable to communicate his decision”113 the immediate question was 
“whether the jurisdiction extends further”.114 Surveying the case law Sir 
Munby concluded that, “[i]n my judgment, it does. I must now explain 
why”:115 
[i]n the light of these authorities it can be seen that the inherent jurisdiction 
is no longer correctly to be understood as confined to cases where a vulnerable 
adult is disabled by mental incapacity from making his own decision about the 
matter in hand and cases where an adult, although not mentally incapacitated, 
is unable to communicate his decision. The jurisdiction, in my judgment, 
extends to a wider class of vulnerable adults.116 
It would be unwise, and indeed inappropriate, for me even to attempt to define 
who might fall into this group in relation to whom the court can properly 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction. I disavow any such intention. It suffices for 
present purposes to say that, in my judgment, the authorities to which I have 
referred demonstrate that the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in relation 
to a vulnerable adult who, even if not incapacitated by mental disorder or 
111. Ibid (the order made in Re SA prohibited her family from threatening, 
intimidating or harassing SA; using violence on SA; or preventing SA 
from communicating alone with her solicitor. SA’s family was also 
prohibited from applying for any travel documents for SA; removing or 
attempting to remove SA from the jurisdiction of England and Wales; 
and from causing, making arrangements for, or permitting SA to be 
married without her express written consent. The order also provided for 
undertakings from a groom that he will return to live in England if SA 
wished, and that, if SA were to remain in Bangladesh after marriage, a 
visit with an official from the British High commission would be arranged 
for the purpose of establishing her free consent to remain).
112. Ibid at para 46.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid at para 48.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid at para 76.
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mental illness, is, or is reasonably believed to be, either (i) under constraint 
or (ii) subject to coercion or undue influence or (iii) for some other reason 
deprived of the capacity to make the relevant decision, or disabled from 
making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled from giving or expressing a 
real and genuine consent.117 
This inherent jurisdiction would apply to all persons whose “capacity” (as 
described by Sir Munby) has been impaired in one of the senses, and for 
one of the reasons, referred to in the passage above but was “not confined 
to those who are vulnerable adults, however that expression is understood, 
nor is a vulnerable adult amenable as such to the jurisdiction”.118 
The significance in this context of the concept of a vulnerable adult is pragmatic 
and evidential: it is simply that an adult who is vulnerable is more likely to 
fall into the category of the incapacitated in relation to whom the inherent 
jurisdiction is exercisable than an adult who is not vulnerable. So it is likely 
to be easier to persuade the court that there is a case calling for investigation 
where the adult is apparently vulnerable than where the adult is not on the face 
of it vulnerable. That is all.119
Sir Munby’s reference to the “concept of the vulnerable adult” seems in 
relation to members of vulnerable populations, who are only more likely 
to be “incapacitated or disabled from giving or expressing a real and 
genuine consent”. 
Granting the order sought (“designed to provide a practical solution 
to the concerns raised by the local authority and other professionals and, 
very importantly, to reflect what SA herself wants and expects from her 
husband”),120 Sir Munby stated that: 
[b]y taking this course, far from depriving SA of her right to make decisions 
I am ensuring, as best I can, that she has the best possible chance of future 
happiness. I am taking these steps to protect, support and enhance SA’s capacity 
to control her own life and destiny in the way she would wish.121 
The analysis developed in Re SK and Re SA was applied outside of the 
arranged marriage context in the case of A Local Authority v A,122 regarding 
117. Ibid at para 77.
118. Ibid at para 83.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid at para 27.
121. Ibid at para 133.
122. [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam).
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a “vulnerable” 29 year old woman with severe learning difficulties and 
an assessed IQ of 53 (“A”) who was found to be incapable of making 
decisions in relation to contraception, “not to a small extent due to her 
husband’s negative influence on her decision-making capacity”.123 Before 
her marriage A had given birth to two children, both of whom had been 
removed from her care after birth. The local authority was concerned that 
her husband was putting her under pressure to refuse contraception, and 
provided evidence that A had complained that her husband had hit her 
and that she did not wish to have a baby.124 A is not described in the case 
as “mentally incapable”; rather, the court ascribes A’s inability to make 
her own decision regarding contraception to the totality of her “cognitive 
limitations”, “social impairment”, and “personal characteristics, associated 
with both her learning disability and her personality, in connection with 
her ‘ambivalence (including mixed feelings and confusion) about her 
husband and the pressure he seems to place on her to have a family’”.125 
In the opinion of a consultant retained by the local authority, the 
“pressure” experienced by A from her husband was contributed to “by 
Mrs. A’s personal characteristics” and by “Mr. A’s personal characteristics, 
including a suspicious and hostile stance in relation to support services, 
leading to his giving Mrs. A mixed messages about what is in her interests, 
thereby ‘confusing her’ more and therefore incapacitating her further”.126 
On the basis of the “completely unequal dynamic in the relationship 
between Mr. and Mrs. A” the court concluded that “her decision not 
to continue taking contraception is not the product of her free will”127 
and that “[w]here such circumstances pertain … the court has a wide 
inherent jurisdiction to prevent conduct by the dominant party which 
coerces or unduly influences the vulnerable party from making free 
decisions”.128 Regarding the question of whether the Mental Capacity 
Act, a comprehensive legislated scheme regarding mentally incapable 
123. Ibid at paras 36-38.
124. Ibid at paras 18, 32, 34. 
125. Ibid at para 51. 
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid at para 73.
128. Ibid at para 79.
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adults, had removed the need/justification for exercising the inherent 
jurisdiction the court in regards to an “incapacitated person” (incapacity 
here referring to A’s inability to make her own decisions due to the matrix 
of factors described above), the court concluded that the “wide inherent 
jurisdiction” of the court applied to an incapacitated person in the same 
way as to a person with capacity, “except that the aim of providing him or 
her with relief from the coercion is first to gain capacity and, if achieved, 
then to enable him to reach a free decision”.129 
B. DL v A Local Authority 
The case of DL v A Local Authority provides the most complete articulation 
of the equitable doctrine of undue influence as providing the doctrinal 
justification for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction in the vulnerable-
but-capable cases.
In that case, a local authority sought and was granted an injunction 
(on the basis of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to make a declaration 
that the injunction was lawful) against a 55 year old son (“DL”) for the 
purpose of “regulating” his controlling, threatening and coercive conduct 
towards his (mentally capable) 85 year old mother. The mother, wishing 
to preserve her relationship with her son, did not want any proceedings 
taken against him.130 
The decision was appealed on the question of “whether, despite the 
extensive territory now occupied by the [Mental Capacity Act 2005], a 
jurisdictional hinterland exists outside its borders to deal with cases of 
‘vulnerable adults’ who fall outside that Act and which are determined 
129. Ibid at paras 79-80 (in the event, as Mr. A had given assurances to the 
court that he would not block A’s communication with professionals who 
could advise her in an “ability-appropriate way” about contraception, the 
court decided not to make an order restricting contact or conduct but 
to rely on Mr. A “to honour his assurances to the court … in a spirit of 
co-operation in trying to enable A to reach contraceptive capacity” at para 
80); see also Local Authority X v MM, KM, [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam); 
Re A (Male Sterilisation), [2000] 1 FLR 549 (CA (Civ)(Eng)); LBL v RYJ 
and VJ, [2010] EWHC 2665 (Fam) [RYJ and VJ].
130. Local Authority, supra note 7 at para 8.
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under the inherent jurisdiction”.131 The appeal was dismissed. The court 
defined the scope and purpose of the existing “jurisdictional hinterland” 
as limited “to facilitat[ing] the process of unencumbered decision-
making” rather than “imposing a decision upon [a person] whether as to 
welfare or finance”.132 The court continued:
I do not accept that the jurisdiction … is extensive and all-encompassing, or 
one which may threaten the autonomy of every adult in the country. It is … 
targeted solely at those adults whose ability to make decisions for themselves 
has been compromised by matters other than those covered by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. I, like Munby J before me in Re SA, am determined not to 
offer a definition so as to limit or constrict the group of ‘vulnerable adults’ for 
whose benefit this jurisdiction may be deployed … The appellant’s submissions 
rightly place a premium upon an individual’s autonomy to make his own 
decisions. However this point, rather than being one against the existence of 
the inherent jurisdiction in these cases, is in my view a strong argument in 
favour of it. The jurisdiction … is in part aimed at enhancing or liberating the 
autonomy of a vulnerable adult whose autonomy has been compromised by a 
reason other than mental incapacity.133
In the circumstances of this case, the conclusion that the “inherent 
jurisdiction remains available for use in cases that fall outside the [Mental 
Capacity Act 2005]”134 was further justified on a “sound and strong public 
policy basis”135 the “sadly all too easy to contemplate … existence of elder 
abuse” although “the use of the term ‘elder’ in that label may inadvertently 
limit it to a particular age group whereas, as the cases demonstrate, the 
will of a vulnerable adult of any age may, in certain circumstances, be 
overborne”.136 
Where the facts justify it, such individuals require and deserve the protection 
of the authorities and the law so that they may regain the very autonomy that 
the appellant rightly prizes. The young woman in Re G who would, as Bennett 
J described, lose her mental capacity if she were once again exposed to the 
unbridled and adverse influence of her father is a striking example of precisely 
131. Ibid at para 1, per Lord Justice McFarlane.
132. Ibid at para 32 quoting from the decision of Justice Macur in RYJ and VJ, 
supra note 130 at para 62; see also Westminster City Council v C, [2008] 
EWCA Civ 198.
133. Local Authority, supra note 7 at paras 53, 54.
134. Ibid at para 63, per Justice David.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
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this point.137
DL had put forward the argument that the legislature had considered 
incorporating undue influence into the ambit of the Mental Capacity 
Act and decided against it as an “immensely complex” exercise in 
drafting” that would require “significant safeguards to avoid unnecessary 
intervention”.138 DL’s contention was that the legislature had explicitly 
excluded undue influence induced “incapacity” and it was not for the 
court to reintroduce it by other means.139 The omission was not a gap, 
but a deliberate space. That argument was unsuccessful; the legislature’s 
inability to codify undue influence confirms the court’s ongoing 
responsibility vis a vis identifying and responding to this particular source 
of harm. The non-legislatibility of undue influence reflects the varied 
nature of undue influence itself, requiring in each case a “meticulous 
examination of the facts”.140 The nature of undue influence, and the 
particular inequity with which the doctrine is concerned, requires the 
kind of judicial response that is provided through the exercise of the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court. 
V. Implications for Canadian Law
The interpretation and application of a distinct undue influence based 
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction in the English courts (the vulnerability 
jurisdiction described in DL v A Local Authority) is complicated in 
Canadian law by two factors. The first of these is the confusion, referred 
to above, between the new jurisdiction and parens patriae. Canada, never 
having excised the traditional parens patriae jurisdiction with regards to 
incapable adults (referred to in Re Eve as “a carefully guarded”),141 has 
no need for a “new” or revived parens patriae. The second complicating 
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid at para 37, citing a joint committee report of both the Houses of 
Parliament considering the draft Mental Health Bill. 
139. Ibid at para 39.
140. National Westminster Bank v Morgan, [1985] 1 AC 686 at 709 (HL).
141. Re Eve, supra note 10 (“[t]he courts will not readily assume that it has 
been removed by legislation where a necessity arises to protect a person who 
cannot protect himself” at para 75).
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factor is Canadian judicial interpretation of the inherent jurisdiction of the 
court, which has focused overwhelmingly on the “core” jurisdiction that is 
protected by section 96 of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982.142 
The interaction between these two factors can be seen in the 
decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Temoin v Martin143 
(“Temoin”), considered the question of whether the inherent jurisdiction 
could be invoked for the purpose of ordering a medical examination 
in connection with an application for committeeship pursuant to the 
Patients Property Act.144 Declining to exercise the inherent jurisdiction for 
this purpose, Madam Justice Fisher described the “essential purpose” of 
the jurisdiction as 
to maintain and protect its [the court’s] own adjudicative powers … by way of 
regulating the practice of the court and preventing abuse of its process. This 
is demonstrated by the kinds of cases in which inherent jurisdiction has been 
invoked: see, for example, MacMillan (contempt of court) and Caron (interim 
costs).145 
Justice Fisher concluded that parens patriae was “more appropriate to 
the issues raised by the Petitioner”146 but the prima facie incompetence 
required for the exercise of that jurisdiction had not been established 
(as parens patriae could not be exercised with respect to capable adults). 
The facts of Temoin are in fact suggestive of the more complicated form 
of impaired decision making capacity described in the case of A v A 
Local Authority,147 an inter-section of relationship context, intellectual 
limitation, and personality (Temoin concerned an individual, M, who 
142. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11; see e.g. 
Criminal Lawyers, supra note 20; see also Reference re Amendments to the 
Residential Tenancies Act (NS), [1996] 1 SCR 186. 
143. 2011 BCSC 1727, aff’d 2012 BCCA 250 [Temoin].
144. RSBC 1996, c 349; see Temoin, supra note 143 at para 1.
145. Temoin, supra note 143 at para 44 (cases in which the court has ordered 
a medical examination for the purposes of providing evidence and 
facilitating a fair trial include Kujawa v Kujawa (1990), 87 Sask R 101 
(QB); Hayman v Criddle, 2010 SKQB 94; Barnes (Litigation Guardian of ) 
v London (City) Board of Education (1994), 34 CPC 3d 51 (Ont Sup Ct J 
(Div Ct)).
146. Temoin, supra note 143 at para 45.
147. [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam).
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was suffering from cognitive decline and also “significant pressure” from 
his second wife to change his will and to make other transactions).148 
Once defined as a case about the appropriate exercise of parens patriae, 
however, the focus shifted solely to the issue of M’s bio-cognitive capacity 
and the case is replete with discussions of the various capacity tests which 
M had undergone and the scores or outcomes of those tests; in contrast to 
the English cases interpreting and applying the inherent jurisdiction, M’s 
relationship context and its impact on his decision-making is invisible.
The inherent jurisdiction of the court has been drawn on to grant a 
common law restraining order in two Alberta cases: RP v RV 149 (“RP”) 
and ATC v NS.150 These cases suggest a broader interpretation of the 
jurisdiction151 (beyond the “core”) on the basis of its nature as “a residual 
source of powers, which the court may draw on as necessary whenever it 
is just or equitable to do so” (enabling “the judiciary to uphold, to protect 
and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to 
law in a regular, orderly and effective manner”).152 Justice Hughes in 
RP granted a common law restraining order (in a family law context) 
describing the order as an injunction, “an order, historically of an equitable 
nature, restraining the person to whom it is directed from performing 
a specific act”.153 In doing so, Hughes J described the “common law 
jurisdiction to grant a restraining order” as 
flow[ing] from the inherent jurisdiction of provincial superior courts to 
hear any matter properly coming before it, in combination with the general 
power of those courts to grant injunctive relief as equitable remedy … [t]he 
discretionary power to grant all manner of injunctions is an equitable remedy 
148. Ibid at paras 5-15.
149. 2012 ABQB 353. The applicant in that case sought a common law 
restraining order rather than a protection order pursuant to the Protection 
Against Family Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, s 4.
150. 2014 ABQB 132 [ATC].
151. Although this is not explicitly stated; the implication is in the application, 
and the reasons given for it.
152. ATC, supra note 149 (Justice Hughes in RP v RV, supra note 148 referring 
to the passage from Caron, supra note 20 at para 17).
153. ATC, supra note 149 at para 15.
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that dates back to English law.154 
RP was subsequently applied in the 2014 case of ATC Justice Lee 
concluding that the inherent jurisdiction of the court “must be more 
encompassing than its common law historical development and as well 
… go beyond its present statutory limits”.155 Granting a restraining order 
as an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction it was therefore necessary only 
for the court to determine: 
[t]hat the parties genuinely do not get along and are a threat to each other, 
not necessarily in terms of their personal safety or property damage, but also 
in terms of the damage that can be done to their reputations and lives … 
This harm is not physical harm involving one’s personal safety, or damage or 
property, but still is serious emotional harm carried out through the internet, or 
caused by stalking and other harassing behavior … Accordingly … the practical 
solution to the problem is simply to use the Court’s inherent jurisdiction in 
matters such as this to grant permanent mutual restraining orders in favour of 
each party against the other.156
The Alberta cases show the inherent jurisdiction being exercised outside 
of its “core” and for a purpose unconnected to the court’s ability to control 
its own administration and operation; in these cases the jurisdiction is, 
indeed, being drawn upon to respond to a particular form of intensified 
vulnerability that is not recognized or provided for in legislation, drawing 
on the “great safety net” of the common law and equity to do so. 
VI. Conclusion
Recognizing and articulating the “heroic judicial invention” of an 
“entirely novel jurisdiction” as an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction 
that is separate and distinct from parens patriae has the potential to 
facilitate future development of this “lusty child of equity” in the 
154. ATC, supra note 149 at paras 16, 19 (the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
and authority to grant equitable relief has been codified in the Alberta 
Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c. J-2, ss 8, 13(2) but did not derive from it). 
155. ATC, supra note 149 at para 18. 
156. Ibid at paras 18-19; see also R v Burke, 2012 NSSC 119. In this case the 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court invoked the inherent jurisdiction to grant a 
common law peace bond, while recognising that the jurisdiction should 
be used “sparingly”.
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Canadian courts.157 This new vulnerability jurisdiction incorporates the 
idea of vulnerability as essential to the human condition, made more 
or less intense dependent on the interplay between social/relationship 
context and one’s biological or embodied state of being (as opposed 
to the association of vulnerability with “vulnerable populations”). The 
objective of the “novel jurisdiction” is to provide a measured and coherent 
response to the vulnerability caused by relationships of oppression and 
exploitation which may then, as explained in Re G, increase physiological 
and/or cognitive resilience, and therefore autonomy. This is an exciting, 
and very modern, idea.
157. Munby, supra note 1. For Munby, of course, equity’s newest child was a 
new parens patriae applying to vulnerable adults.
